Techniques for dealing with reverse causality between institutions and economic performance by Cingolani, L & de Crombrugghe, D.P.I.
  
 
Techniques for dealing with reverse causality between
institutions and economic performance
Citation for published version (APA):
Cingolani, L., & de Crombrugghe, D. P. I. (2012). Techniques for dealing with reverse causality between
institutions and economic performance. (UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series; No. 034). Maastricht: UNU-
MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2012
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
#2012-034 
               
 
 
 
Techniques for dealing with reverse causality between  
institutions and economic performance 
Luciana Cingolani and Denis de Crombrugghe 
 
 
 
 Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic Growth: IPD WP03 
 
This working  paper  is  part  of  the  research  programme  on  ‘Institutions, Governance  and 
Long‐term  Economic  Growth’,  a  partnership  between  the  French  Development  Agency 
(AFD)  and  the Maastricht Graduate  School  of Governance  (Maastricht University  – UNU‐
Merit). The research builds on the  Institutional Profiles Database  IPD,  jointly developed by 
AFD and the French Ministry of the Economy since 2001.  
 
ISSN 1871‐9872 
 
Maastricht Economic and social Research institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU‐MERIT) 
email: info@merit.unu.edu | website: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) 
email: info‐governance@maastrichtuniversity.nl | website: http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu 
 
Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499 
 
UNU‐MERIT Working Paper Series 
AFD‐MGSoG/UNU‐Merit Working Paper Series on  
« Institutions, Governance and Long term Growth » 
 
 
In 2010, the French Development Agency (AFD)  initiated a partnership with the Maastricht 
Graduate  School  of  Governance  (Maastricht  University  ‐  UNU‐Merit)  with  a  view  to 
exploring the conceptual and econometric relationships between institutions and long‐term 
growth.  As  a  development  bank  with  a  long‐term  lending  horizon,  AFD  is  particularly 
interested  in  better  understanding  the  determinants  of  countries’  long  term  economic, 
social, and political trajectory.  
 
AFD has thus developed a programme on “Institutions, Governance, and Long‐term Growth” 
dealing with the five following dimensions:  
(i) Measuring institutions and discussing the meaning of such measures, notably 
through the Institutional Profiles Database;  
(ii) Testing the econometric relationship between institutional measures and long 
term growth;  
(iii) Exploring through a series of country case studies the historical relationship 
between processes of economic accumulation, forms of political organisation, 
and social cohesion;  
(iv) Discussing conceptual frameworks for making sense of the interaction between 
political, social and economic forces in the process of development; 
(v) Developing methodologies for political economy analyses.  
 
The MGSoG/UNU‐Merit team  is  involved  in the  five dimensions with a particular  focus on 
the  first  two.  Its primary objective  is  to explore  the  Institutional Profiles Database  jointly 
developed by AFD and the French Ministry of the Economy since 2001. Institutional Profiles 
Database  is  unique  by  its  scope  (about  350  elementary  questions  pertaining  to  all 
institutional  dimensions  covering  148  countries  in  2012),  its  entirely  free  access,  and  its 
ambition  to  incorporate  the  most  recent  theoretical  advances  in  the  field  of  political 
economy.  
 
The present series intends to convey the results of our ongoing research, and in so doing to 
reflect  the  wealth  of  issues  that  can  be  fruitfully  addressed  from  an  “institutionalist” 
perspective. We hope that readers will find these papers stimulating and useful to develop 
their own understanding and research.  
 
Nicolas Meisel (AFD) 
Adam Szirmai (MGSoG/UNU‐Merit) 
 
 
For more information on the programme, please visit our websites:   
http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Schools/MGSoG/ProjectPages/InstitutionalProfilesDatabase.htm 
http://www.afd.fr/lang/en/home/recherche/themes‐recherches/institutions‐gouvernance‐croissance 
Techniques for Dealing with Reverse Causality
between Institutions and Economic Performance
Luciana Cingolani∗
Denis de Crombrugghe†
January 31, 2012
Abstract
This article provides a succinct review of the arguments stressing the
mutual relationship between institutions and economic performance, and
a scholarly account of some of the most popular econometric strategies
used to minimize reversed causality problems in impact estimation. Among
the techniques revisited we find the instrumental variables (IV) approach,
distributed lags and vector autoregressions (VAR), quasi-experiments, and
identification by heteroskedasticity (IH). Ultimately, the review is conceived
as a methodological aide to researchers seeking to explore causal relation-
ships through the use of the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) produced
by the Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement (AFD).
1 Introduction
The way interactions occur between the economic and the institutional domains
in societies has been the subject of extensive research and debate1. The quest for
finding causation mechanisms that link one to the other has propelled a burgeon-
ing literature of theoretical and empirical nature, which often acknowledged the
difficulties in assigning causes and effects. Yet, the importance that policymakers
∗Maastricht Graduate School of Governance - UNU-Merit. Email: luciana.cingolani@ maas-
trichtuniversity.nl
†Maastricht University School of Business and Economics. Email:
d.decrombrugghe@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1For an overview of the debates see Aron (2000), Ju¨tting (2003), Shirley (2005), deHaan
(2007), Kohn (2009).
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and scholars have granted to isolating the impacts of political decisions and in-
stitutional incentives, as well as to finding precise determinants of high economic
performance, turned into a priority the development of methodological techniques
designed to overcome endogeneity problems arising from different sources. These
techniques have become more refined as the debate on institutions and economic
performance evolved, and as data availability increased significantly.
The aim of the present work is to provide a succinct review of the debate on the
mutually-determined relationship between institutions and economic performance,
and to provide a scholarly account of some of the most frequently used strategies to
measure the impact of institutions on GDP levels or GDP growth2, while minimiz-
ing endogeneity problems. Ultimately, the review is conceived as a methodological
aide to researchers making use of the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) pro-
duced by the Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement (AFD).
The following section will present a brief overview of the main theoretical argu-
ments put forward in the literature to try and understand channels of causality
linking institutions and economic performance. The case is made that causality
is likely to run both ways, so that institutions and growth are both part of a si-
multaneous system of mutual determination. Acknowledging this possibility has
severe consequences for statistical inference on the interrelationships. Section 3
introduces some of the main techniques used to account for such endogeneity: (a)
the instrumental variables approach (IV), (b) the use of lagged variables, (c) quasi-
experimental designs, and (d) vector autoregressions (VARs). Some key articles
resorting to these different methods are outlined. The dominant method in the
literature is, easily, instrumental variables. Section 4 takes “the proof of the pud-
ding” by testing the usefulness of a number of the available instrumental variables
for institutions in the context of the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD). The
fifth and final section concludes.
2Within the concept of economic performance, it is importante to draw attention towards the
distinction between output levels and output growth. Although the academic debates are mostly
framed around the relationship between institutions and growth, in reality different authors refer
to different independent variables (regarding this, see the complementary paper by Meisel and
Ould Aoudia (2008) ”Is Good Governance a Good Development Strategy?”). In order to cover
both options, we choose the more encompassing concept of ’economic performance’, even at the
risk of it being too encompassing.
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2 Channels of causality between institutions and
economic performance
The early nineties marked the start of a renewed era for institutions in all corners
of the developing world. The transition from soviet regimes to market economies
fostered a fervent interest in knowing which liberal institutions were the most suit-
able for boosting the economic performance of the new partners coming into the
globalized economy. In Latin America, the initial excitement for the Washington
consensus policies was buffered by the realization that these policies would only
be successful where good institutions pre-existed. In Africa, it became more and
more clear that traditional growth models relying on capital, labour and technol-
ogy endowments failed to predict the continent’s long and persisting frail perfor-
mance.
Against this rather deceptive backdrop, scholars brought institutions back to light
in different forms: as civil liberties and political rights, as different forms of gover-
nance, as property rights, as trade and fiscal policy, as political instability proxied
by coups d’e´tat, regime duration, social revolts and violence (Aron 2000). By and
large, a general consensus about the definition of institution was never achieved,
but empirical literature has tended to resort to two main types of proxies: rule
of law, mostly in terms of property rights, and democracy levels. The reason is
twofold: influential theories have linked these two concepts with economic perfor-
mance since early on, and -not coincidentally- data availability has slanted research
in the same direction. As a consequence, a plethora of works have put the spot-
light on the relationship between institutions and economic performance3. A few
studies have shown skepticism and vowed for a cautious interpretation of this re-
lationship, claiming that findings prove the relationship insignificant or difficult to
substantiate empirically (Glaeser et al. 2004; Rodrik 2008). In particular, several
works raise doubts about a positive association between democratic regimes and
growth (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990; Przeworski and Limongi 1993, Helliwell 1994
and Alesina et al. 1996; Brunetti 1997 and Minier 1998). Moreover, several au-
thors have even claimed the relationship between these two is negative (Levine
and Renelt 1992; Tavares and Wacziarg 2001; Dollar and Kraay 2003).
However, mainstream academic works show a positive relationship between some
measure of institutional quality and growth (e. g. Knack and Keefer 1995; Borner
et al. 1995; Sala-i-Martin 1997; Barro 1998; Rodrik 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001;
3An insightful literature review on the topic is found in Bluhm and Szirmai (2011). For a
deeper exploration of the relationship between good governance and development, see Meisel
and Ould Aoudia (2008). For a discussion on the proximate and ultimate causes of growth see
Szirmai (2011).
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Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; Rodrik et al. 2004; Persson and Tabellini 2005).4
Regarding the causal mechanisms that lie underneath this relationship, however,
scholarship continues to turn to classic theories. In these theories it is possible
to find equally appealing arguments for both parts of the simultaneous causation
problem: arguments that explain why growth has been a historic prerequisite of
institutional development, and inversely, why institutional maturity has been a
prerequisite for growth and aﬄuence.
One famous argument of why and how growth brings about institutional devel-
opment was motivated in the late fifties by Seymour Lipset, an exponent of the
modernization theory: increasing wealth results in changes in political culture, and
this, in turn, in political systems. In that sense, wealth is a facilitating condition
for democracy, and at the same time higher economic development means higher
chances for democracies to become self-legitimizing in the long run. Lipset argued
that several modernization variables existed: wealth, industrialization, urbaniza-
tion and education. At the same time, the effect of these modernization factors
worked through additional intervening variables, such as democratic culture, class
structure changes and state-society relationships. The conditions that propelled
democratic demands and institutional change were deemed to be the social req-
uisites for democracy. Democracy would only survive for longer periods when it
proved well performing, legitimate and economically efficient (Lipset 1959). An-
other argument behind the idea that growth brings more and better institutions
suggests that as countries become wealthier, they can afford to dedicate more
resources to institution building (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2006).
Others, however, have proposed a somewhat different view on the directionality of
the growth-institutions relationship. The idea that institutions are mainly respon-
sible for first setting the conditions for prosperity was the start of a fertile stream
of literature, later known as new institutionalism. Taking a historical economy
approach, North and Thomas (1973) resort to the notion of institutions as legal
constraints to government expropriation, and place the focus on the importance
that property rights have in fostering economic development. This view is linked
to the transaction costs economics approach previously made famous by Robert
Coase (1937), according to which it is believed that uncertainty about property
rights and contracts increases the transaction costs that need to be internalized
by investors. Therefore, institutions understood as constraints reduce the uncer-
tainty present in economic exchanges, and provide the incentives that structure
behaviour in societies, which in turn determines the economic path followed by a
4For comprehensive reviews on the empirical findings and debates, see Sirowy and Inkeles
1990; Alesina and Perotti 1994, Brunetti 1997; Minier 1998; Aron 2000; Ju¨tting et al. 2003;
Me´nard and Shirley 2008.
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country (North 1990).
Although these exponents take slightly different angles on the directionality, they
both conceive an interdependent relationship. Lipset recognizes democratic atti-
tudes as an explanation of economic modernization, and North acknowledges that
institutions change incrementally according to different factors, including relative
costs and prices in the economy. A rather well-established consent arising from this
complexity is that the two factors are mutually reinforcing, in a cycle where ex-
pectations of better institutions propel economic growth, and contexts of aﬄuence
provide the most suitable setting for the sustainability of high-quality institutions
in the long run (Przeworski et al. 2000; Persson and Tabellini 2006).5
In sum, as Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) formulate it: “problems of
endogeneity and reverse causality plague any empirical researcher trying to make
sense of the relationships among these causal factors.” (p. 133) If reverse causality
problems are not dealt with, the result is the incapability of knowing how the
interactions between development and institutional advancements take place, and
how interventions should be managed. In the following section, we provide a
technical overview of different techniques to minimize biases, and how they have
been applied.
3 Methods for dealing with simultaneity
On a broad definition, a regressor is endogenous when it is correlated to the error
term. This correlation can have different sources: omitted variable bias, measure-
ment error, sample selection bias, misspecification of the functional form, serial
correlation combined with lagged dependent variables, and/or simultaneity. The
focus of this article is on the problem of simultaneity, a situation in which two vari-
ables are co-determined, like the variables xi and yi in the following system:
yi = βxi + ui (1)
xi = γyi + vi (2)
where the subscript i indexes the observations; ui and vi are unobserved distur-
bance or error terms; and β and γ are parameter measuring the respective causal
effects.
5This general consensus is not undisputed, however, as authors like Kaufmann and Kraay
argue that evidence shows a strong positive relationship going from better governance to higher
per capita income, and a negative relationship running from per capita income to governance
(Kaufmann and Kraay 2002).
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As a consequence of this co-determination, none of the equations can be estimated
consistently by standard OLS techniques.
The first empirical studies assessing the relationship between institutions and eco-
nomic performance did not pay much attention to the problem of simultaneity,
and suggested only statistically significant associations between institutions and
growth on the basis of cross-sectional data (see Aron 2000 for a rather compre-
hensive review of these early works). Later on, as more data became available and
more sophisticated methods became feasible, simultaneity problems were taken
more seriously, and specific techniques started to be applied in the field to allevi-
ate these problems.
3.1 Instrumental variables
The instrumental variables approach (IV) is without doubt the most widely used
technique to deal with simultaneity problems in econometric specifications. For
illustration, let us consider a linear model in its simplest static form:
yi = βxi + ui (3)
where the subscript i is an index for observations; yi is the dependent variable
and xi is an explanatory variable; ui is an unobserved disturbance or error term
comprising all other determinants of yi; and β is a parameter measuring the causal
effect of xi on yi. For the sake of simplicity, all variables are expressed in deviations
from their population means. If it holds that E(xiui) = 0 then the standard OLS
estimator is consistent. However, when E(xiui) 6= 0 due to simultaneity (or for
any other reason), the OLS estimator of the impact of xi on yi is biased and
inconsistent because even in large samples it converges to the wrong probability
limit:
p lim βˆOLS =
E(xiyi)
E(x2i )
= β +
E(xiui)
E(x2i )
6= β .
A valid instrumental variable zi is one that meets two conditions, called relevance
and exogeneity.
1. Relevance: zi is substantially correlated with the causal variable of interest
xi, so that
E(zixi) 6= 0
2. Exogeneity: zi is uncorrelated with the unexplained part of yi, so that
E(ziui) = 0 .
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The IV model, therefore, implies that the instrument is correlated with the depen-
dent variable, but exclusively through the endogenous explanatory variable. The
rationale for these conditions is that they guarantee that the probability limit of
the IV estimator (to which it converges in large samples) is
p lim βˆIV =
E (ziyi)
E(zixi)
= β +
E(ziui)
E(zixi)
which equals β if and only if both these conditions hold. In these expressions,
the instrumental variable zi (like yi and xi) is expressed in deviations from its
mean.
A well-known way to obtain and understand the IV estimator is via two-stage least
squares (2SLS). The first stage consists of regressing the endogenous explanatory
variable (xi) on the instrument (zi), as well as any other exogenous covariates
appearing in the model. One then obtains the predictions (in our illustration)
xˆi = zipˆi (4)
where pˆi is the resulting OLS estimate (often called a reduced-form coefficient).
These predicted values xˆi can be interpreted as a version of the explanatory variable
xi from which the endogenous variation (the dependence on ui) has been “cleaned
out”, as only the exogenous variation (explained by zi) has been kept in. The
second stage consists of regressing the dependent variable yi on the predicted
series xˆi from the first stage regression. That is, one estimates
yi = xˆiβ + (xi − xˆi) β + ui = xˆiβ + wi .
Given the validity of the instrumental variable zi, the composite disturbance wi =
(xi − xˆi) β + ui that we find in this second-stage regression is uncorrelated with
the instrumental regressor xˆi. Therefore, OLS will estimate β consistently or “free
of simultaneity bias”.
With divergences in terms of techniques, samples and conceptualizations, numer-
ous empirical studies have attempted to identify exogenous sources of variation
providing instrumental variables for institutional quality. In the remainder of this
subsection, we will review a selection of those empirical studies that have provoked
discussion or achieved some prominence in the literature.
In their 2001 article published in the American Economic Review, Acemoglu, John-
son and Robinson (henceforth AJR) present the novel idea of using European set-
tler mortality rates during three centuries as an instrument for institutions. The
argument behind this, is that different types of colonization led to different insti-
tutions, depending on the incentives Europeans had to reside permanently on the
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colonies. In the colonies where settler mortality expectations were high, settlers
set up extractive states, without great protection of property rights or guaran-
tees against government expropriation. On the contrary, where settler mortality
levels were lower, they had incentives to reside in the colonies, and fostered in-
stitutions that envisioned limits to the executive powers and their expropriation
potential.
Within this framework, the authors argue that European mortality levels can be
used to instrument institutions and, subsequently, find out the partial effect of the
latter on economic growth levels. In order to comply with the exclusion restriction
(the assumption that the regression error has zero conditional mean, conditionally
on the instrument), they put forward the argument that settlers’ mortality rates
more than 100 years ago are unlikely to have an impact on today’s economic
performance, other than through institutions. Parallel to this, they address the
threat to the exclusion restriction posed by factors that are potentially correlated
with settler mortality and also determine income levels, such as identity of the
main colonizer, legal origin, climate, religion, geography, natural resources, soil
quality and ethnolinguistic fragmentation, as well as controls for current disease
levels. They find that none of the estimates changes substantially once controlling
for these covariates.
The impact of the work by AJR has been huge, yet some weaknesses have also
been pointed out. First, their narrow definition of “institutions”: this refers to
guarantees against expropriation risk and is proxied by the expropriation risk index
of the Political Risk Services. Secondly, settler mortality information is available
for only a small set of countries (the 64 countries that were ex-colonies), and
even so it is constructed from very partial sources concerning those countries (see
Albouy 2008).6 Thirdly, Khan (2012 forthcoming) advances a profound critique
of AJR’s interpretation of history, by questioning the alleged stability brought by
white settlers.
Tracing further back the use of instrumental variables, AJR refer to two previous
widely cited works: Mauro (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999). In order to asses
the effects of bureaucratic corruption, Mauro (1995) instruments corruption using
an index of ethnolinguistic fragmentation. His research makes use of the Business
International (BI) database7, comprising information on BI correspondents’ per-
ceived measures of corruption, red tape, and the efficiency of the judicial system
for the years 1980 until 1983, for a total of 70 countries. The index of ethno-
linguistic fragmentation he uses as an instrument measures the probability that
6For a follow-up on the latest works by Acemoglu and others on the same topic and a detailed
critique of their work, see the complementary paper by Bluhm and Szirmai (2011).
7Which is part of the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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two individuals drawn randomly in a country belong to different ethnolinguistic
groups.8 Ethnolinguistic fragmentation is assumed “exogenous” to both economic
performance and institutional quality. As additional instruments, Mauro (1995)
also constructs dummies of whether the country was ever a colony, and whether the
country was still a colony in 1945. The results show that institutional inefficiency
proxied by bureaucratic corruption is strongly associated with lower levels of pri-
vate investment, also after controlling for other determinants of investment.
Hall and Jones (1999) choose distance from the equator as an instrument for social
infrastructure, based on the argument that latitude is correlated with Western
influence, and this influence, in turn, affects institutions. They also use the share
of the population speaking English and the share speaking a major European
language as instruments for institutional quality. Acemoglu et al. (2004) argue
that in the work of both Mauro (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999), the instruments
may easily have a direct influence on growth and therefore fail the exogeneity
condition.
Another largely cited instrument is that of Frankel and Romer (1999), who calcu-
late the fitted values of trade predicted by a gravity model, in order to instrument
for actual trade/GDP ratios. Their gravity equation accounts for bilateral trade
as a function of country mass, distance between partners, and a few geographical
measures. The resulting aggregate index of trade is used to instrument actual
trade, as a determinant of income levels.
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) estimate the independent effect of institu-
tions, geography and trade on income levels. By resorting to the IV approach, they
aim to identify the impact of the two endogenous variables (institutional quality
and international trade levels), while also measuring the impact of geography on
incomes, both directly and through each of the other two as intermediary chan-
nels. For this purpose they choose to simultaneously include geography, integration
(levels of international trade) and institutions among the determinants of income
levels. They resort to the Frankel and Romer (1999) instrument for integration,
and the Acemoglu et al. (2001) instrument for institutions. Their results show a
significant impact of institutions, which “trump” both trade and geography, once
they are controlled for. They test the robustness of their results against different
sample sizes, extending the original sample of 64 countries used by Acemoglu et
al. (2001). In order to enlarge the sample, they must replace the Acemoglu et al.
(2001) settler mortality instrument with the more accessible instruments of Hall
and Jones (1999): fraction of English and Western-European languages speakers
within a country.
8This index refers to 1960 and was calculated by Taylor and Hudson (1972).
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Glaeser et al. (2004) pay close attention to the definition of institutions used in
the growth and institutions literature. They explore it in different forms: risk of
expropriation, government effectiveness and constraints to the executive. They
argue that the first two result in outcomes that do not distinguish between con-
straints and choices (e.g. they do not distinguish between a dictator choosing
property rights, and a democratic leader which has no other choice than support-
ing property rights). In the third case, they contend that these constraints on the
government reflect only the outcome of the most recent elections, which are for
the most part volatile in developing countries, instead of durable rules (as institu-
tions should be). Regarding the instrumental variables model of Acemoglu et al.
(2001), they argue that rather than institutions, settlers brought human capital to
the colonies, and that the latter is the better predictor for growth. Furthermore,
because settlement patterns may affect growth through other channels than insti-
tutions, they do not consider them as valid instruments for institutions (Glaeser
et al. 2004, p.21).
Eicher and Leukert (2009) seek to examine parameter heterogeneity in the rela-
tionship between institutions and per capita incomes, by contrasting institutional
impacts on a subset of developed economies versus a subset of developing ones.
They depart from the work by Hall and Jones (1999) using instrumental variables,
arguing that the instruments these authors use are no longer valid when accounting
for parameter heterogeneity. In order to account for this heterogeneity, Eicher and
Leukert split the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries. They construct
new instruments on the conceptual basis of the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis
(Acemoglu et al. 2005b; Persson 2004; Eicher and Schreiber 2010), which contends
that a sequential three-link causal chain exists between constitutional/political in-
stitutions, economic institutions, and economic outputs. Given this sequentiality,
the authors argue that constitutional and political institutions can be a valid in-
strument for economic institutions, and these, in turn, have a direct impact on
growth. Their results suggest that the effect of institutions varies across the two
subsets, having three times larger impact in developing countries.
3.2 Dynamics
3.2.1 Distributed lags and state dependence
The aim of models with lagged variables is to allow for causal effects that are
lingering over some period of time rather than instantaneous.9 Some of these
9It may be pointed out here that dynamic models may help to identify causal chains (or at
least minimize reverse causation) through time sequencing; we will return to this possibility in
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models resort to distributed lag regressions, in which Yt is expressed as a function
of current and past values of Xt. The set of past values of interest are included
among the explanatory variables in the specification, in order to avoid the omitted
variable bias that would be caused by delayed effects. For example, the relationship
might be expressed as
Yt = β0 + β1xt + β2xt−1 + β3xt−2 + ut. (5)
Other dynamic specifications address state dependence (yt being determined by
yt−1) by including lagged values of the dependent variable:
yt = γyt−1 + βxt + t (6)
or, in a panel context relevant for our purposes,
yit = γyi,t−1 + βxit + αi + it. (7)
Dollar and Kraay (2003), while using the instrumental variables approach, estimate
causal effects at different points in time. They seek to assess the partial effect of
both institutions and trade on growth, by regressing ten-year (“decadal”) growth
rates on instrumented changes in trade and instrumented changes in institutional
quality. They argue that a close interaction exists between trade and institutions,
and as a consequence, existing literature tends to fail when trying to apply an
identification strategy to isolate the partial effects of each in the long run. They
argue that previous specifications are weakly identified, as both sets of instruments
have a strong explanatory power for both endogenous variables. The result is high
multicollinearity in the second-stage regressions.
In order to overcome the multicollinearity problem associated with static estimates,
Dollar and Kraay (2003) propose to exploit time variation in the data through a
dynamic analysis. In a model in first differences, decadal changes in real per
capita GDP growth are regressed on their lagged values and on contemporaneous
changes in trade and in institutional quality, instrumented by their respective lags.
Formally, their estimating equation is of the type
yct−yc,t−k = β1(yc,t−k−yc,t−2k) +β′2(Xct−Xc,t−k) + (γt−γt−k) + (vct− vc,t−k) (8)
where yct is the log of GDP per capita in country c at time t; yc,t−k is its lag k
years ago; and Xct is a set of regressor variables (possibly measured as decadal
averages) including trade volumes and institutional quality measures.
Subsection 3.2.3.
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Dollar and Kraay’s measure of institutional quality is based on a composite indi-
cator of rule of law constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2002), measuring the period
2000-2001. They argue that their first-difference model has several advantages in
terms of measurement error, omitted variables and endogeneity. Regarding the
first, it corrects for some biases that arise from measuring cross-sectional levels of
the variables instead of differences. It avoids omitted variable bias by controlling
for constant (or almost constant) factors such as colonial history or geographic
characteristics. In terms of endogeneity, Dollar and Kraay argue that the set
of instruments is more natural than the alternatives previously proposed. The
underlying assumption of the model is that, whereas trade volumes and institu-
tional quality measures may be correlated with current and lagged shocks to GDP
growth, they are uncorrelated with future shocks to GDP growth. Their results
suggest that the long-term partial effects of both trade and institutions on growth
are substantial, but the role of trade is more important in the short run.
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006) focus on the role of democracy and the rule
of law in promoting growth. They challenge the conventional notion that while
rule of law exerts a significant influence on growth, democracy is innocuous to it.
Since measures of democracy and rule of law tend to be highly correlated, yet are
important to distinguish, they make an effort to isolate the impact of each. Based
on a comprehensive sample and a three-stage least squares (3SLS) technique, the
authors conclude that both variables exert a significant effect on growth, and
moreover that the impact of democracy is higher in developing countries.
It is worthwhile to mention some details of the approach of Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya
(2006). The overall sample comprises a hundred countries, from 1970 to 1999. Five
different measures of democracy are included, as well as five measures of rule of
law. As dependent variables, the authors use the average annual growth rates of
real per capita GDP during three decades: the 70s, the 80s, and the 90s. The
model they estimate is of the type
γyt = F (yt, kt, ht;Zt) (9)
where γyt is a country’s average per capita growth rate in period t, yt is the coun-
try’s initial GDP per capita, kt is the initial stock of physical capital per person,
ht is initial human capital per person, and Zt is a vector of control and environ-
mental variables, including various measures of democracy and rule of law. The
authors first estimate the effects of rule of law and of democracy in two separate
specifications, using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique, as in
Barro (1997). Here, up to three different equations are estimated (one for each
decade10), allowing for correlation of the error term across equations, a condition
10Only two for the specification including rule of law.
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that arises from including initial GDP levels in each decade. According to these
estimates, three out of five of the rule of law measures have an impact on GDP
per capita growth, while none of the democracy measures exert a similar impact.
Later on, the authors propose an alternative technique, also used by Barro (1997),
involving 3SLS estimation and instrumenting rule of law and democracy. As an
instrument for rule of law they resort to the index of ethnic fragmentation previ-
ously used by Mauro (1995); and for democracy to secondary school enrollment
rates. The authors’ findings demonstrate that once controlling for endogeneity
through instrumental variables, it is possible to find large and significant effects of
both democracy and rule of law measures on growth.
3.2.2 Vector autoregression (VAR)
Vector autoregressive (VAR) models seek to capture the interrelations of a set of
endogenous variables over a certain period of time, by describing each variable as
a linear function of its lagged values. A VAR of order 1 (with one lagged value),
for example, can be specified as the two-equation system:
yt = c1 + β1yt−1 + β2xt−1 + t (10)
xt = c2 + γ1yt−1 + γ2xt−1 + ut (11)
The work by Hsiao and Shen (2003) is concerned with the way foreign direct
investment (FDI) contributes to the growth prospects of developing countries.
Within this framework, the authors seek to unravel two sequential relationships:
on one hand, which intangible factors (such as bureaucracy, degree of openness,
institutional stability and urbanization) affect FDI levels, and on the other, how
strong are the feedback relations between FDI and real gross domestic product
(GDP). For the latter purpose, they use two data sources: time-series data for
China 1982-1998, and panel data on 23 developing countries between 1976 and
1997. As simultaneity is likely between FDI and GDP, they lay out a simultaneous
equations model with the recursive form:
y1,t = c1 + a1(L)y1,t−1 + a2(L)y2,t + u1,t (12)
y2,t = c2 + b1(L)y1,t−1 + b2(L)y2,t−1 + u2,t (13)
where y1,t is the log of real GDP; y2,t is the log of FDI levels; c1 and c2 are constants;
L is the lag operator; ai(L) and bi(L) are lag polynomials (autoregressive operators)
of the form ai(L) = ai1 + ai2L + ... + aipiL
pi and bi(L) = bi1 + bi2L + ... + biqiL
qi ;
and u1,t and u2,t represent independent error terms. Therefore, the model assumes
that FDI is a component of real GDP, and at the same time, that FDI levels are
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determined by lagged GDP. As a way to determine the polynomial orders pi and qi,
Hsiao and Shen resort to a methodology proposed by Hsiao (1979). The resulting
equations for the Chinese time series data are:
log(GDPt) = c1 + a11log(GDPt−1) + a21log(FDIt) + u1,t (14)
log(FDIt) = c2 + b11log(GDPt−1) + b21log(FDIt−1) + b22log(FDIt−2) + u2,t (15)
where log(GDPt) = y1,t and log(FDIt) = y2,t. Three-stage least squares estimation
for the Chinese data yields the result that a 1 % increase in FDI raises GDP by
barely 0.0005% in the short run; in the long run however, direct and indirect effects
accumulate to raise GDP by 5.45%. On the other hand, an increase of 1% in GDP
raises FDI by 2.12% in the short run, and 34.45% after 10 years.
The results of a similar assessment based on data from 23 developing countries be-
tween 1976 and 1997 show estimates that are consistent with the results from China
11. In this sense, Hsiao and Shen are able to establish with some degree of precision
the existence and extent of feedback relations between FDI and GDP.
3.2.3 Time sequencing
It may be worth emphasizing here that dynamic models may help to identify causal
chains (or at least minimize reverse causation) through time sequencing. Suppose
it takes some time for institutions to affect growth performance, and for growth
performance to feed back into institutions; and that the implied time lags are not
shorter than a period of observation. Although both causal relationships involve
explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous, these are predetermined
rather than contemporaneously endogenous. It is then possible to specify the
model as a recursive rather than a simultaneous system of relationships, in effect a
VAR.12 Standard estimation methods will not be affected by simultaneity biases;
OLS will be consistent. The paper of Hsiao and Shen (2003) discussed above is a
case in point. The main reason why this possibility is used so little in the context of
the growth-institutions nexus is probably not that sufficient time lags are unlikely,
but rather that data are too limited. Historical series on institutional aspects
measured over time in a consistent way are rare and, where they exist, they may
contain very little time variation, since institutions do not usually change fast in
a peaceful context.
11Data on GDP for China and the 23 developing countries comes from the World Development
Indicators, while FDI levels are from the International Monetary Fund, International Finance
Statistics (IFS).
12This requires that structural shocks or disturbance terms are uncorrelated across equations.
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3.3 Quasi-experimental designs
There is a growing trend among researchers on institutions to make use of tech-
niques that emulate the conditions of randomized controlled experiments. Such
experiments have three characteristics: a) experimental subjects are exposed to a
“treatment” and later contrasted to a “control” group, where the treatment is ab-
sent; b) there is random assignment of the subjects to either treatment or control
groups, which guarantees the absence of confounders explaining resulting differ-
ences between the groups; and c) the administration of the treatment is exclusively
done by the researcher (Dunning 2008). These conditions have the advantage of
allowing for inference regarding causal relations on the variables of interest.
In quasi-experimental designs, the level of exogeneity of the treatment variable
is sometimes at stake. The treatment is usually the consequence of an event of
some kind, for which randomness is often more difficult to argue for. Yet, this
randomness remains the underlying assumption of these models.
3.3.1 Difference-in-differences models
The difference-in-differences technique can be applied when there is information
available on the same observations before and after the experiment. The estimation
of the impact of an intervention (treatment) on a certain population, is done by
comparing pre and post treatment values of the variable of interest in both treated
and non treated groups. As mentioned earlier, one condition is that the treatment
variable is randomly assigned within the population of interest, and thus, can be
claimed to be an exogenous source of variation. The estimation principle can be
formalized as follows:
βˆdid = (Y¯ta − Y¯tb)− (Y¯ca − Y¯cb) = 4Y¯treatment −4Y¯control (16)
where βˆdid is the difference-in-differences estimator; Y is the variable of interest;
Y¯ta is the treatment group average of Y after the treatment and Y¯tb is the treatment
group average of Y before the treatment; Y¯ca is the average of Y in the control
group after the treatment and Y¯cb is the average value of Y in the control group
before the treatment.
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) resort to a difference-in-difference design to
assess the effect of democratization on short and long term growth. They point
out that in contrast to cross country analyses, the relationship becomes signif-
icant when using time-series information. For this design to work, there needs
to be strict exogeneity of the reform variable (change of regime) by random as-
signment. In this respect, they cite the work by Acemoglu et al. 2005a showing
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that the correlation between income and democracy almost vanishes when using
differences instead of levels. This finding would make reversed causation a lesser
concern. Within the control group, Papaioannou and Siourounis include countries
where regime change is absent, representing three different categories: democratic,
autocratic and intermediate governments. In order to overcome the assumption
that democratization is conditionally uncorrelated with other time-varying factors,
they add the proper controls for these factors. Although they manage to minimize
the concern of reversed causation, the authors acknowledge that it is difficult to
establish causality.
3.3.2 Natural experiments
When arguing that economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences
in per capita income, Acemoglu et al. (2005b) resort to two quasi-experiments to
document their findings: (1) the partition of Korea into North and South Korea
after World War II, and (2) the colonization pattern followed by European settlers
starting in the fifteenth century, already mentioned in section 3.1.
Acemoglu et al. (2005b) characterize the Korean case as one of the clearest natural
experiments for institutions. The reason for this is that while Korea shared a
unified history under Japanese domination prior to 1945, the Soviet occupation of
North Korea after the end of the war was a purely exogenous shock that determined
quasi-randomly the establishment a different set of institutions on each side.13
While the North turned to Soviet socialism and abolished property rights, the
South preserved property rights and successfully developed a market economy. In
terms of both culture and geography, the authors argue that nearly all aspects were
similar between the two countries at the moment of the division, or, if anything,
benefited the North (Acemoglu et al. 2005b: 405). Drawing inferences from this
natural experiment, the authors conclude that the dramatically different paths
undertaken in terms of economic performance can be attributed to the different
institutions established.
Eicher and Schreiber (2010) also resort to a natural experiment to measure the
short term effects of structural policies on annual growth. They make use of
time-series data on 26 East-European transition countries over a period of eleven
years (1991-2001). The set-up and adequacy of the natural experiment is given by
the authors’ contention that the fall of the iron curtain provides an ideal source
of exogenous institutional change, from communist to capitalist institutions. The
proxies for structural policies are built through a composite structural policy index,
13The Republic of Korea was established to the South of the 38th parallel.
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with measures of market-supporting institutions -such as price liberalization, trade
openness, privatization, competition policy, etc.- taken from the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition reports. An additional
proxy for structural policies is the ICRG Rule of Law measure. Proxies for political
institutions are democracy measures from Polity IV. System GMM (Generalized
Method of Moments) is used to estimate transformed relationships of the following
type:
Yi,t − Yi,t−1 = β4Ii,t + γYi,t−1 +4νt +4i,t (17)
where Yi,t denotes per capita income growth in country i at time t; Ii,t is a struc-
tural policy index; vt is a time-fixed effect; and i,t is white noise. In order to
construct instruments with panel data, Eicher and Schreiber proceed in two differ-
ent ways. Following the standard GMM approach, they include the third, fourth
and fifth lags of the per capita income growth as instruments. As an alternative,
they resort to the hierarchy of institutions theory in order to use a country’s con-
stitutional features as instruments for structural policies (see Section 3.1 above).
As both strategies show similar results, the authors conclude that the short term
contemporaneous effects of structural policies on growth are substantial: a ten
percent increase in the quality of institutions raises annual growth rates by 2.7 per
cent.
3.4 Identification through Heteroskedasticity (IH)
A final approach to be mentioned here is identification through heteroskedasticity,
a method advocated recently by Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Rodrik (2005).
Suppose a plausible argument can be made that the world consists of two (or more)
groups of countries that differ in the degree of “tightness” of the institutions-growth
relationships. The groups are known so the data can be split accordingly, and the
tightness of the relationships will be measured by the respective variances of the
structural disturbance terms. For instance, Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) split the
world in countries that have been colonized by European powers and countries
that have not. They argue that colonization had a homogenizing influence, reduc-
ing the variance of shocks to which countries have been subjected, yet leaving the
impact of institutions on income or growth unaltered. Another split they propose
relates more directly to geography, distinguishing between countries in continents
extending on a North-South axis (Africa and the Americas) versus countries in
continents extending on an East-West axis (Eurasia). Because the diffusion of
agricultural technologies is easier on an East-West axis (mainly for climatic rea-
sons), they expect the variance of income shocks to be larger in the North-South
sample.
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How do such splits help identification? The basic idea is (as in 2SLS methods)
to start by estimating the reduced form rather than the structural form of the
model. The reduced form is a system of equations from which endogenous re-
gressors have been substituted out. Since it contains only exogenous (or, more
generally, predetermined) regressors, the reduced form is easy to estimate without
running into the problem of simultaneity bias. In general (as in standard simulta-
neous equations models), there are too few reduced-form coefficients to identify all
the structural coefficients. However, a split in the sample that shifts the variances
without affecting the structural coefficients generates additional information, in
the form of identifying moment equations. From the reduced form, apart from the
coefficients, not one but two (or more if the split is multiple) variance-covariance
matrices can be estimated consistently (assuming the split is sufficiently balanced).
Each reduced-form covariance provides an additional restriction or “moment equa-
tion” that can (in principle) be exploited in the recovery of structural parame-
ters. The additional moment equations will only be useful provided the number
of structural-form parameters is not increasing in parallel with the number of
reduced-form parameters. This is achieved by a relatively standard identifying
assumption, namely, that structural shocks or disturbance terms are uncorrelated
across structural equations. So, on the one hand, splitting the world in two groups
of countries doubles the number of structural as well as reduced-form error vari-
ances to be estimated. On the other hand, the split does not create any unknown
structural covariances (correlations across equations), whereas it doubles the num-
ber of estimable reduced-form covariances. The increasing number of reduced-form
moments helps identify the structural coefficients of interest, and easily tilts the
balance from an underidentified to an overidentified structural form.
The exploitation of the moment equations to recover the structural parameters is
not an ordinary linear regression problem. The state-of-the art way to deal with
it as efficiently as possible is found in the same family as “minimum distance”
estimators and the “Generalised Method of Moments” (GMM). An increasing
number of econometric and statistical softwares, including Stata (from version
11), proposes advanced GMM procedures.
4 Testing instruments on IPD 2009
Section 3.1 has shown that the use of instrumental variables has been legitimized
as a valid option to minimize simultaneity bias in the context of the growth and
institutions literature. The present section is dedicated to testing the validity of
the instruments reviewed in this article, and to estimate the impact of institutions
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on growth making use of this tool. In order to do this, we resort to the mea-
sures of institutions that have been reported in de Crombrugghe and Farla (2009).
These measures consist of two main principal components (PCs) that arise from
an exploratory analysis of the 3-digit variables in IPD 2009. The first PC refers
to the formalization of regulation and depersonalization, while PC2 refers to rule
and degree of State intervention. Our dependent variable of interest is the mean
rate of per capita growth over the period 2000 - 2007 taken from the Penn World
Tables.
Table 1 presents the results of the estimations including a large set of instruments.
The first type of instruments refers to settler mortality rates, where mort, expresses
settler mortality rates as computed in Acemoglu et. al. (2001); mort2 is Albouy’s
(2008) corrected settler mortality rates; logmort0 is the log of settler mortality as
computed in Acemoglu et. al. (2001); and logmort2 is the log of settler mortality
corrected by Albouy (2008). Second, it presents the measures proposed by Mauro
(1995) to instrument corruption: avelf, the average of the five ethnolinguistic frag-
mentation indexes reported in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny
(1999), plus two additional dummies: ex2col, whether a country was ever a colony,
and ex2col45, whether the country was still a colony in 194514. A third set of
instruments put to test is that of Hall and Jones (1999). They use distance from
the Equator (disteq) to instrument institutions, as well as two other variables:
engfrac, the share of the population speaking English and eurfrac, the share of
the population speaking a major European language. Finally, Eicher and Leukert
(2009) use constitutional and political institutions to instrument economic insti-
tutions. In order to avoid multicollinearity, their two baseline political institutions
are xconst1990 : constraints to the executive in 1990, and xrreg1990 : executive
recruitment regulation also in 1990, and taken from the Polity IV database.
The estimation of the impact of institutions on growth also includes a few covari-
ates of relevance: the level of economic openness in 2007 (chain series 2005, from
PWT 6.3); the log of GDP per capita in 1995 from Rodrik, Subramanian and
Trebbi (2004); the investment share of real GDP per capita in 2007, from PWT
6.3; and the population in 2007 from Maddison databases 2010.
In each of the specifications we report the coefficients of both the first and the
second stage IV regressions, as well as the F statistic of the Stock and Yogo (2005)
strong instrument test (instrument validity) and the p value of the Hansen J test
of overidentifying restrictions (instrument exogeneity).
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation including the AJR instruments.
14Given the countries included in the samples, ex2col had to be dropped due to perfect mul-
ticollinearity.
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Table 1: Impact of Institutions on Growth with IV technique (AJR instru-
ments included)
pc1 pc2 Per Capita
Growth (log)
Settler mortality rates (mort) 0.000 –0.001 –
(0.000) (0.000)
Settler mortality rates corrected (mort2) 0.000 0.001 –
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of settler mortality (logmort0) –0.415 0.714 –
(0.441) (0.599)
Log of settler mortality corrected (logmort2) 0.033 –0.07 –
(0.235) (0.334)
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation (avelf) 1.06 0.807 –
(0.849) (1.286)
Colony in 1945? (ex2col45) 1.32*** –1.394 –
(0.484) (0.989)
Distance to the Equator (disteq) 0.027 0.005 –
(0.027) (0.023)
Fraction of English speakers (engfrac) 2.353** 0.647 –
(1.121) (0.884)
Fraction of Eur language speakers (eurfrac) 3.137*** -0.975 –
(1.778) (1.409)
Constraint to the executive in 1990 (xconst1990) 0.084 0.096 –
(0.1) (0.14)
Executive recruitment regulation (xrreg1990) 0.004 –0.004 –
(0.01) (0.012)
First PC (pc1) – – 0.001
(0.002)
Second PC (pc2) – – –0.003
(0.008)
Economic Openness in 2007 (pw openk2007) – – –0.000
(0.000)
Log of GDP per capita 1995 (lcgdp95) – – –0.006
(0.004)
Investment share (pw ki2007) – – 0.0006**
(0.0003)
Population in 2007 (mill) – – 0.021
(0.015)
N 50 50 50
R2 0.80 0.58 0.23
F statistic 8.51 1.72 –
Stock Yogo F – – 1.893
Hansen p – – 0.35
Notes: significance levels reported as *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; two tailed. Inter-
cept not reported, standard errors in parenthesis. Stock Yogo is the F statistic test for
weak identification, with significance thresholds according to Stock and Watson (2002).
Hansen p is the p-value of the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions of all but one
instrument, the joint null being that the instruments are valid.
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When this happens, the sample is left with a total of 55 countries. The first
two columns report the results of the first-stage estimations of the impact of the
instruments on the two principal components.
The dummy taken from Mauro (1995) measuring whether the country was a colony
in 1945, as well as the two Hall and Jones (1999) language dummies are significant
when explaining the variance in the first principal component. For the second
principal component, however, none of the instruments are significant. The Stock
Yogo F test is well below the critical values, and it is therefore not possible to
reject the weak instruments hypothesis15. The last column reports the estimated
coefficients of the two instrumented institutional measures, as well as the small set
of covariates chosen to explain growth. It does not find significance in any of the
the two principal components. Of all covariates, only the share of investment in
2007 results significant at the 5% level. The p-value of the Hansen J statistic passes
the overidentification test, meaning that it cannot be rejected that the instruments
are exogenous.
Table 2 presents a similar estimation, but excluding the instruments of AJR, in
order to maximize the number of observations, which amounts to 88 in this regres-
sion. It is easy to observe that now all of the instruments except for regulation
of executive recruitment are significant in explaining the variance of the first PC.
For the second PC, the situation has changed only marginally from the previous
estimation, as now ethnolinguistic fragmentation has become significant. When
estimating the impact of institutions on growth, the situation remains is very sim-
ilar to the previous table, where only investment share is significantly associated
with growth. Regarding the instrument validity tests, it occurs once more that
the Stock-Yogo test is failed, whereas the overidentification test is passed.
5 Conclusions
As Rodrik et al. (2004) rightly pointed out, endogeneity problems abound in the
study of the interactions between institutions and growth. The literature on the
subject has acknowledged the limitations and challenges inherent to the empirical
analysis of data aiming at unveiling the precise impact of different institutions
on growth. These challenges arise not only from potential biases in econometric
15In any case, this is expected to happen when several instruments are tested jointly. When
each set of instruments is tested individually on each PC, we find that all sets (logmort0 logmort2;
avelf; ex2col ex2col45; disteq; engfrac eurfrac; xconst1990 xrreg1990 ) but mort and mort2 pass
the test for PC1, and only avelf passes the test for PC2.
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Table 2: Impact of Institutions on Growth with IV technique (AJR instruments
excluded)
pc1 pc2 Per Capita
Growth (log)
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation (avelf) 1.64*** 1.977** –
(0.55) (0.869)
Colony in 1945? (ex2col45) –1.55** –0.44 –
(0.47) (0.571)
Distance to the Equator (disteq) 0.048*** 0.015 –
(0.015) (0.015)
Fraction of English speakers (engfrac) 1.064** –0.208 –
(0.52) (0.454)
Fraction of Eur language speakers (eurfrac) 1.171*** 0.472 –
(1.36) (1.45)
Constraint to the executive in 1990 (xconst1990) 0.308*** 0.166 –
(0.086) (0.131)
Executive recruitment regulation (xrreg1990) –0.000 0.002 –
(0.004) (0.007)
First PC (pc1) – – 0.001
(0.002)
Second PC (pc2) – – 0.002
(0.005)
Economic Openness in 2007 (pw openk2007) – – 0.000
(0.000)
Log of GDP per capita 1995 (lcgdp95) – – –0.007
(0.006)
Investment share (pw ki2007) – – 0.0006**
(0.0003)
Population in 2007 (mill) – – 0.043
(0.019)
N 88 88 88
R2 0.85 0.44 0.09
F statistic 8.78 1.21 –
Stock Yogo F – – 1.071
Hansen p – – 0.49
Notes: significance levels reported as *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; two tailed. Intercept
not reported, standard errors in parenthesis. Stock Yogo is the F statistic test for weak
identification, with significance thresholds according to Stock and Watson (2002). Hansen p
is the p-value of the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions of all but one instrument,
the joint null being that the instruments are valid.
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specifications, but also from conceptual discussions about how to conceptualize
and measure different institutions.
In this article we have reviewed some of the most frequently used techniques to
account for reversed causality problems in the institutions and economic perfor-
mance literature. For the full methodological details on each, the reader should
be referred to the corresponding original articles and seek support from the econo-
metric literature. Overall, we have been able to see that several alternatives are
available, but the pertinence of each depends ultimately on the type of data the
researcher uses and the purpose of the analyses. Mathematically, they are all suit-
able for minimizing biases as long as the assumptions behind each are met. At
the same time, all of them are perfectible and subject to some level of controversy
that should be taken into account.
The nature of the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) entails features that pro-
vide an advantage for certain analyses, while at the same time the researcher
should be warned about some limitations.
IPD has a great level of detail in terms of both the formal policies as well as the
de facto practices that countries pursue. In this sense, IPD offers the possibility
to control for numerous meso-level institutions, such as labor market institutions,
fiscal federalism and state organization, all essential intervening factors in the rela-
tionship between institutions and growth (Durham, 2004). IPD, therefore, has the
potential of providing a great richness of variation in institutions across countries,
and insights into their interactions. At the same time, the same richness of the
database serves the purpose of testing hypotheses with different conceptualizations
of institutions, an aspect that has been greatly emphasized as a potential source
of bias.
The cross-sectional nature of the database allows for the implementation of iden-
tification strategies that are feasible for a cross sectional setting, such as IV esti-
mation in its simplest form. One section of this article was dedicated to provide
an empirical confrontation of the relative strengths and weaknesses of some of the
different proposed instruments and alternative estimators.
In order to apply any of the other techniques, however, IPD needs to be comple-
mented with alternative databases, or else systematize its panel data components,
in order to retain information of the countries included during previous points in
time. Part of these challenges are undertaken in the complementary paper by Cin-
golani and de Crombrugghe (2012), on the panel component of IPD. The richer
the historical depth of the data, the more sophisticated the techniques available
become.
23
References
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., and Yared, P. (2005a). Income and
democracy. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No.
11205.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins
of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American Economic
Review, 91(5):1369–1401.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2005b). Institutions as the
fundamental cause of long-run growth? In Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. N.,
editors, Handbook of Economic Growth. North Holland, Amsterdam.
Acemoglu, D., Verdier, T., and Robinson, J. A. (2004). Kleptocracy and Divide-
and-Rule: a model of personal rule. Journal of the European Economic Associ-
ation, 2(2-3):162–192.
Albouy, D. Y. (2008). The colonial origins of comparative development: An inves-
tigation of the settler mortality data. National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper Series, No. 14130.
Alesina, A., O¨zler, S., Roubini, N., and Swagel, P. (1996). Political instability and
economic growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2):189211.
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1994). The political economy of growth: a critical
survey of the recent literature. The World Bank Economic Review, 8(3):351.
Alesina, A. and Rodrik, D. (1994). Distributive politics and economic growth. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2):465–490.
Aron, J. (2000). Growth and institutions: a review of the evidence. The World
Bank Research Observer, 15(1):99.
Barro, R. J. (1997). Determinants of economic growth: a cross-country empirical
study. The MIT Press.
Barro, R. J. (1998). Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empir-
ical Study, volume 1 of MIT Press Books. The MIT Press.
Bluhm, R. and Szirmai, A. (2011). Institutions and long-run growth performance.
Working paper, Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement.
Borner, S., Brunetti, S., and Weder, B. (1995). Political credibility and economic
development (St. martin’s press, new york).
24
Brunetti, A. (1997). Political variables in cross-country growth analysis. Journal
of Economic Surveys, 11(2):163–190.
Butkiewicz, J. L. and Yanikkaya, H. (2006). Institutional quality and economic
growth: Maintenance of the rule of law or democratic institutions, or both?
Economic Modelling, 23(4):648–661.
Cingolani, L. and de Crombrugghe, D. (2012). Exploring the panel components of
the institutional profiles database (IPD). Working paper, Agence Franc¸aise de
De´veloppement.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16):386–405.
DeCrombrugghe, D. and Farla, K. (2011). Preliminary conclusions on insti-
tutions and economic performance. Working paper, Agence Franc¸aise de
De´veloppement.
deHaan, J. (2007). Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered. Public
Choice, 131(3-4):281–292.
Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. (2002). Growth is good for the poor. Journal of Economic
Growth, 7(3):195–225.
Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. (2003). Institutions, trade, and growth. Journal of
monetary economics, 50(1):133–162.
Dunning, T. (2008). Improving causal inference. Political Research Quarterly,
61(2):282 –293.
Durham, J. B. (2004). Economic growth and institutions: Some sensitivity anal-
yses, 1961-2000. International Organization, 58(3):485–529.
Eicher, T. S. and Leukert, A. (2009). Institutions and economic performance: En-
dogeneity and parameter heterogeneity. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
41(1):197–219.
Eicher, T. S. and Schreiber, T. (2010). Structural policies and growth: Time
series evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Development Economics,
91(1):169–179.
Frankel, J. A. and Romer, D. (1999). Does trade cause growth? The American
Economic Review, 89(3):379–399.
Glaeser, E. L., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2004). Do
institutions cause growth? Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3):271–303.
25
Hall, R. E. and Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more
output per worker than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1):83–116.
Helliwell, J. F. (1994). Empirical linkages between democracy and economic
growth. British Journal of Political Science, 24(02):225–248.
Hsiao, C. (1979). Autoregressive modeling of canadian money and income data.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74(367):553–560. ArticleType:
research-article / Full publication date: Sep., 1979 / Copyright 1979 American
Statistical Association.
Hsiao, C. and Shen, Y. (2003). Foreign direct investment and economic growth:
the importance of institutions and urbanization. Economic development and
Cultural change, pages 883–896.
Ju¨tting, J. (2003). Institutions and development: a critical review. OECD.
Kaufmann, D. and Kraay, A. (2002). Growth without governance. Economa,
3(1):169–229.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Zoido, P. (2002). Governance matters II: updated
indicators for 2000-01. Policy Research Working Paper 2772, World Bank, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Khan, M. (2012). Governance and growth: History, ideology and methods of
proof. In Noman, A., Botchwey, K., Stein, H., and Stiglitz, J. E., editors, Good
Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995). Institutions and economic performance: Cross-
Country tests using alternative institutional indicators. Technical report, Uni-
versity Library of Munich, Germany.
Kohn, M. (2009). Economic development and growth: A survey. Cato Journal,
29(2).
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1999). Investor
protection: Origins, consequences, reform. Technical report, Harvard - Institute
of Economic Research.
Levine, R. and Renelt, D. (1992). A sensitivity analysis of Cross-Country growth
regressions. The American Economic Review, 82(4):942–963.
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development
and political legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1):69–105.
26
ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: Mar., 1959 / Copyright
1959 American Political Science Association.
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
110(3):681 –712.
Meisel, N. and Ould Aoudia, J. (2008). Is ’Good governance’ a good development
strategy? Working Paper 58, Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement, Paris.
Me´nard, C. and Shirley, M. M. (2005). Handbook of new institutional economics.
Springer.
Minier, J. A. (1998). Democracy and growth: Alternative approaches. Journal of
Economic Growth, 3(3):241–66.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfor-
mance. Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C. and Thomas, R. P. (1973). The rise of the western world: A new
economic history. Cambridge Univ Pr.
Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G. (2008). Democratisation and growth. Eco-
nomic Journal, 118(532):1520–1551.
Persson, T. (2004). Consequences of constitutions. Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, 2(23):139–161.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2005). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. The
MIT Press.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2006). Democracy and development: The devil in
the details. Technical report, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Eco-
nomic Research), Bocconi University.
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy
and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-
1990. Cambridge University Press, 1 edition.
Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1993). Political regimes and economic growth.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3):51–69.
Rigobon, R. (2003). Identification through heteroskedasticity. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 85(4):777–792.
Rigobon, R. and Rodrik, D. (2005). Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income.
Economics of Transition, 13(3):533–564.
27
Rodrik, D. (2000). Institutions for High-Quality growth: What they are and how
to acquire them. Technical report, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Rodrik, D. (2008). Thinking about governance. In North, D. C., Acemoglu, D.,
Fukuyama, F., and Rodrik, D., editors, Governance, Growth, and Development
Decision-Making. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., and Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: The pri-
macy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development.
Journal of Economic Growth, 9(2):131.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997). I just ran four million regressions. Technical report,
Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Shirley, M. M. (2005). Institutions and development. In Mnard, C., editor, Hand-
book of new Institutional Economics. Springer.
Sirowy, L. and Inkeles, A. (1990). The effects of democracy on economic growth
and inequality: A review. Studies In Comparative International Development,
25(1):126–157.
Szirmai, A. (2011). Proximate, intermediate and ultimate causality: Theories and
experiences of growth and development. Working paper, Agence Franc¸aise de
De´veloppement.
Tavares, J. and Wacziarg, R. (2001). How democracy affects growth. European
Economic Review, 45(8):1341–1378.
Taylor, C. and Hudson, M. (1972). World Handbook of Political and Social Indi-
cators. ICSPR, Ann Arbor.
28
The UNU‐MERIT WORKING Paper Series 
 
2012-01 Maastricht reflections on innovation by Luc Soete 
2012-02 A  methodological  survey  of  dynamic  microsimulation  models  by  Jinjing  Li  and  
Cathal O'Donoghue 
2012-03 Evaluating binary alignment methods  in microsimulation models by  Jinjing Li and  
Cathal O'Donoghue 
2012-04 Estimates of the value of patent rights in China by Can Huang 
2012-05 The impact of malnutrition and post traumatic stress disorder on the performance 
of working memory in children by Elise de Neubourg and Chris de Neubourg 
2012-06 Cross‐national trends  in permanent earnings  inequality and earnings  instability  in 
Europe 1994‐2001 by Denisa Maria Sologon and Cathal O'Donoghue 
2012-07 Foreign aid transaction costs by Frieda Vandeninden 
2012-08 A simulation of social pensions in Europe by Frieda Vandeninden 
2012-09 The informal ICT sector and innovation processes in Senegal by Almamy Konté and 
Mariama Ndong 
2012-10 The  monkey  on  your  back?!  Hierarchical  positions  and  their  influence  on 
participants'  behaviour  within  communities  of  learning  by  Martin  Rehm,  Wim 
Gijselaers and Mien Segers 
2012-11 Do Ak models really lack transitional dynamics? by Yoseph Yilma Getachew 
2012-12 The  co‐evolution  of  organizational  performance  and  emotional  contagion  by  R. 
Cowan, N. Jonard, and R.Weehuizen 
2012-13 "Surfeiting,  the  appetite  may  sicken":  Entrepreneurship  and  the  happiness  of 
nations by Wim Naudé, José Ernesto Amorós and Oscar Cristi 
2012-14 Social interactions and complex networks by Daniel C. Opolot 
2012-15 New  firm  creation  and  failure:  A  matching  approach  by  Thomas  Gries,  Stefan 
Jungblut and Wim Naudé 
2012-16 Gains  from  child‐centred Early Childhood Education: Evidence  from a Dutch pilot 
programme by Robert Bauchmüller 
2012-17 Highly skilled temporary return, technological change and Innovation: The Case of 
the TRQN Project in Afghanistan by Melissa Siegel and Katie Kuschminder 
2012-18 New Technologies in remittances sending: Opportunities for mobile remittances in 
Africa Melissa Siegel and Sonja Fransen 
2012-19 Implementation  of  cross‐country  migration  surveys  in  conflict‐affected  settings: 
Lessons  from  the  IS  Academy  survey  in  Burundi  and  Ethiopia  by  Sonja  Fransen, 
Katie Kuschminder and Melissa Siegel 
2012-20 International  entrepreneurship  and  technological  capabilities  in  the Middle  East 
and North Africa by Juliane Brach and Wim Naudé 
2012-21 Entrepreneurship, stages of development, and industrialization by Zoltan J. Ács and 
Wim Naudé 
2012-22 Innovation strategies and employment  in Latin American  firms by Gustavo Crespi 
and Pluvia Zuniga 
2012-23 An  exploration  of  agricultural  grassroots  innovation  in  South  Africa  and 
implications for innovation indicator development by Brigid Letty, Zanele Shezi and 
Maxwell Mudhara 
2012-24 Employment  effect  of  innovation:  microdata  evidence  from  Bangladesh  and 
Pakistan by Abdul Waheed 
2012-25 Open  innovation,  contracts,  and  intellectual  property  rights:  an  exploratory 
empirical study by John Hagedoorn and Ann‐Kristin Ridder 
2012-26 Remittances provide resilience against disasters in Africa by Wim Naudé and Henri 
Bezuidenhout 
2012-27 Entrepreneurship and economic development: Theory, evidence and policy by Wim 
Naudé 
2012-28 Whom to target ‐ an obvious choice? by Esther Schüring and Franziska Gassmann 
2012-29 Sunk  costs,  extensive  R&D  subsidies  and  permanent  inducement  effects  by  Pere 
Arqué‐Castells and Pierre Mohnen 
2012-30 Assessing contingent  liabilities  in public‐private partnerships (PPPs) by Emmanouil 
Sfakianakis and Mindel van de Laar 
2012-31 Informal knowledge exchanges under complex social relations: A network study of 
handloom clusters in Kerala, India by Robin Cowan  and Anant Kamath 
2012-32 Proximate,  intermediate  and  ultimate  causality:  Theories  and  experiences  of 
growth and development by Adam Szirmai 
2012-33 Institutions and long‐run growth performance: An analytic literature review of the 
institutional determinants of economic growth by Richard Bluhm and Adam Szirmai 
2012-34 Techniques  for dealing with  reverse  causality between  institutions and economic 
performance by Luciana Cingolani and Denis de Crombrugghe 
